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Title VII and the "Right" of Trial by Jury
INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits discriminatory em-
ployment practices and provides remedies including reinstatement
and the recovery of back wages. An issue that has arisen is whether
Congress intended that juries hear Title VII cases. The Act itself
does not clearly indicate such an intention or lack thereof; how-
ever, federal judges have denied requests for jury trial. This com-
ment will demonstrate the tensions that exist in this area and the
implications of denying jury trials in Title VII cases.
TITLE VII
Many people believe that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and its subsequent amendment represent the most sweeping
legislation in the area of civil rights.1 It was thought that this legis-
lation would be the catalyst and chief mode of enforcement to
equalize civil rights in employment among the citizens of the
United States. To this end, Title VII made it unlawful to discrimi-
nate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.2
Private parties or the federal government may enforce the Act as
well as interested parties who may join in a suit that has already
originated. Relief for victims of unlawful employment practices is
provided by the Act and includes back pay.4 Title VII essentially
was the first law enacted by Congress to outlaw discrimination
against minorities in private employment, and in order to facilitate
this, Title VII created the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC).5
The ordering of "back pay" is the chief remedy conferred by Ti-
tle VII and is discretionary with the court." Many courts have
1. Civil Rights Act, 42 USC § 2000e et seq (1991).
2. Id. Title VII bans discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or na-
tional origin, and prohibits segregation of work areas.
3. 42 USC § 2000e-5(f)(1), as amended.
4. 42 USC § 2000e-5(g). Back pay in this comment refers to wages that the court
presumes an employee would have earned but for the discriminatory termination.
5. 42 USC § 2000e-4(a).
6. 42 USC § 2000e-5(g). A court may "order such affirmative action as may be ap-
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termed the "back pay" provision as an equitable remedy and
therefore there is no right to trial by jury.7 In Robinson v Lorillard
Corp.,s the Fourth Circuit reiterated that "back pay" is an equita-
ble remedy with the purpose of restoring victims to the status they
would have enjoyed but for the discrimination.9 Because courts
have determined that "back pay" is an equitable remedy, it was
also commonly believed that the litigants were not allowed a jury
trial.10 Therefore, in Ochoa v American Oil Co.," although the
court was sympathetic with the idea of granting a jury trial, a jury
trial was denied on the basis of Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
precedent. 2
SEVENTH AMENDMENT
This brings us squarely to the Seventh Amendment and a deter-
mination of what it guarantees when it speaks of "trial by jury."
The Seventh Amendment states:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a
jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law.1 3
In Curtis v Loether,14 the Supreme Court noted that it was pri-
marily the intention behind the Seventh Amendment to preserve
the right to trial by jury as it existed in 1791 when the Amendment
was originally enacted. However, the Court held that the right to
propriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees,
with or without back pay ... or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate."
Id.
7. Several of these cases will be discussed later in this comment.
8. 444 F2d 791 (4th Cir 1971).
9. Robinson, 444 F2d at 802. Other cases holding the same include Johnson v Geor-
gia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F2d 1122 (5th Cir 1969); United States v Georgia Power
Co., 474 F2d 906 (5th Cir 1973); Head v Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F2d 870 (6th Cir
1973).
10. See 118 Cong Rec S 2278 (daily ed, Feb 22, 1972), where a proposed amendment
to the 1972 revision of the Equal Opportunity Act allowing jury trials was defeated.
11. 338 F Supp 914 (S D Tex 1922).
12. Ochoa, 338 F Supp at 919. See also, Lowry v Whitaker Cable Corp., 348 F Supp
202 (W D Mo 1972), aff'd, 472 F2d 1210 (8th Cir 1973), stating that in order to sustain a
claim for a jury trial, the nature of the claim would have to sustain the right to a jury trial
at the time of the adoption of the Seventh Amendment.
13. US Const, Amend VII. For an interesting and informative analysis of the history
of the Seventh Amendment and the politics involved in its formation, see Alan Howard
Scheiner, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages, the Seventh Amendment, and the
Politics of Jury Power, 91 Colum L Rev 142 (1991).
14. 415 US 189 (1974).
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trial by jury extends beyond those common law forms of action
accepted and practiced during that time.15 For instance, in Pernell
v Southall Realty, 6 the Supreme Court held that the Seventh
Amendment requires trial by jury in even those actions that were
not known at common law as long as the action involves those
rights and remedies that are traditionally involved in an action at
law rather than an action at equity or admiralty.'
7
The phrase "common law" in the Seventh Amendment, as inter-
preted by the Supreme Court, is used in "contradistinction" to eq-
uity and admiralty and includes not only suits recognized by com-
mon law in its earlier and historical proceedings, but also those
suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined.
Thus, those cases that recognized equitable rights and where equi-
table remedies were administered were not entitled to trial by
jury.'" The Curtis case is recognized for holding that the Seventh
Amendment applies to those new causes of action that are created
by Congress as long as the statute creates legal rights and remedies
that are enforceable in an action for damages in courts of law.'9
In Shields v Thomas,20 the Supreme Court declared that the
Seventh Amendment does not include the exclusive jurisdiction of
an equity court, but rather is restricted to rights and remedies that
are legal by nature.21 An interesting aspect of this issue is brought
to light when there is a joinder of legal and equitable issues.22 In
Dairy Queen, Inc. v Wood 2' and Beacon Theatres, Inc. v West-
over,24 it was held that when both legal and equitable claims are
presented in a single case, only in the rarest of circumstances can
the right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through prior deter-
mination of equitable claims. In sum, if a legal claim is joined with
an equitable claim there is a Seventh Amendment right to a jury
trial on the legal claim as well as on all the issues common to both
the legal and equitable claim. The right to a jury trial cannot be
abridged by merely characterizing the legal claim as incidental to
15. Curtis, 415 US at 189.
16. 416 US 363 (1974).
17. Pernell, 416 US at 375.
18. Parsons v Bedford, 28 US 433, 446-47 (1830).
19. Curtis, 415 US at 194.
20. 59 US 253 (1856).
21. Shields, 59 US at 262.
22. See FRCP 18(a), allowing for the joinder of legal and equitable claims.
23. 369 US 469 (1962).
24. 359 US 500 (1959).
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the equitable relief that is sought.2 5
AN ANALYSIS OF TITLE VII UNDER THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT
BACKGROUND
The rules ennunciated in the cases above were brought to bear
on Title VII actions in Beesley v Hartford Fire Ins. Co.2 6 The dis-
trict court in Beesley held that, under Title VII, "back pay" con-
stitutes a form of compensatory or "legal damages." The court em-
phasized that the term "court," as used in Section 2000e-5(g) of
Title VII, does not preclude the finding that a jury may be contem-
plated. After all, juries do decide issues in the "context of a court-
room. '2 7 Emphasis was also placed on Justice Marshall's opinion
in Lorillard v Pons,2 8 where the Court was asked to determine
whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) re-
quires a trial by jury.29 The Beesley court, recognizing that the
ADEA portion in contention was similar to the Title VII language
at issue, opined that Justice Marshall found the term "court" to
embrace a broader meaning than "judge." 0
Justice Marshall, in Lorillard, found that the ADEA does pro-
vide a right to trial by jury." However, Justice Marshall declared
that the Supreme Court was not deciding whether Title VII pro-
vided for a jury trial by way of statute or constitutional right.32
Justice Marshall stated that the ADEA provides for "legal relief'
in the form of back wages, thereby allowing an "absolute right to a
jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.""3 To bolster Justice
25. Ross v Bernhard, 396 US 531, 539 (1970).
26. 723 F Supp 635 (N D Ala 1989).
27. Beesley, 723 F Supp at 638-39.
28. 434 US 575 (1978).
29. Beesley, 723 F Supp at 639.
30. Id. The operative language of the ADEA states:
In any action brought to enforce this Act the court shall have jurisdiction to grant
such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this
Act, including without limitation judgments compelling employment, reinstatement
or promotion, or enforcing the liability for amounts deemed to be unpaid minimum
wages or unpaid overtime compensation under this section.
29 USC § 626(b) (1985) (emphasis added).
Compare the ADEA language with the operative Title VII language:
[T]he court may ... order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may
include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without
back pay ... or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
42 USC § 2000e-5(g) (emphasis added).
31. Beesley, 723 F Supp at 639.
32. Lorillard, 434 US at 583-84.
33. Id at 584.
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Marshall's assertions, the Beesley court emphasized the "make
whole" purpose of Title VII.34 The legislative history of Title VII
evidences a "back pay" provision modeled after the National La-
bor Relations Act.3 5 From this language, we are to undoubtedly
surmise that this includes the use of legal remedies.
The Beesley court went on to state that the Eleventh Circuit
recently had characterized "back pay" as "compensatory damages"
and, as such, these are the type of damages that have included a
right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.3 In sum, the
court believed that "unless Congress expressly disclaims" in a stat-
ute that a right to trial by jury does not exist "for a legitimate
reason," a right to trial by jury will be found to exist when
appropriate.3 7
Whether there is a right to a jury trial will thus depend on the
nature of the issue to be tried rather than merely the character of
the overall action. The court in Beesley explained that:
[In order to determine the] "legal" nature of an issue [we must first con-
sider] the premerger custom with reference to such questions; second, the
remedy sought; and third the practical abilities and limitations of ju-
ries .... [T]he primary [emphasis in this analysis is] the type of relief
sought. 8
Where injunctive relief or backpay is sought, the relief is equitable
and, consequently, there is no entitlement to trial by jury. How-
ever, where the relief sought is composed of compensatory or puni-
tive damages, then there most certainly is an entitlement to trial
by jury.3"
RECENT GUIDANCE
The United States Supreme Court has never directly ruled on
whether there is a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial under
Title VII. However, many recent cases from the Supreme Court, by
analogy, arguably do provide such a right to a jury trial.
In Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v Terry,"
the issue the Supreme Court decided was "whether an employee
who seeks relief in the form of backpay for a union's alleged breach
34. Beesley, 723 F Supp at 644.
35. Id.
36. Id at 647.
37. Id at 650.
38. Id at 651.
39. Id at 652.
40. 494 US 558 (1990).
1992
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of its duty of fair representation has a right to trial by jury. ' 41 In
Local No. 391, the McLean Trucking Company and Local 391 were
parties to a collective bargaining agreement.42 The twenty-seven
respondents were all employed by McLean as truck drivers and
were members of the bargaining units covered by the collective
bargaining agreement. All were members of the union as well.43 As
a result of a change in operations that called for reorganization,
McLean began to transfer the drivers and subsequently began a
cycle of "layoffs and recall."'44 Respondents claimed that McLean
was giving inactive drivers preference over the respondents. 45 Sub-
sequently, another round of "layoffs and recalls" occurred that put
the inactive drivers in an anomalous position of having more se-
niority rights than the twenty-seven respondents." Respondents
claimed that McLean breached the collective bargaining agreement
in violation of Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
and that the Union violated its duty of fair representation. 7 The
remedy sought by respondents included a permanent injunction re-
quiring the defendants to reinstate the respondents to the required
seniority status and to cease all illegal acts, and also sought com-
pensatory damages for lost wages and health benefits. 4" The dis-
trict court held that there was a Seventh Amendment right to a
jury trial on the claim for monetary relief. The Fourth Circuit af-
firmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 49
After holding that the union had a duty of fair representation to
serve the interests of all its members, the Supreme Court next ad-
dressed whether there was a constitutional right to a jury trial in
this case.50 The Court, realizing that the jury is of historical impor-





46. Id at 562.
47. Id. Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, provides for suits
by and against labor unions:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization repre-
senting employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or be-
tween any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Id at 562 n 1, quoting Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat 156
(1947), codified at 29 USC § 185(a) (1982).
48. Local No. 391, 494 US at 562-63.
49. Id at 563.
50. Id at 563-64.
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tance and significance to American jurisprudence and as such oc-
cupies a special place, noted that any curtailment of the right to a
jury trial should be "scrutinized with the utmost care."51 The
framework in determining whether a particular action will resolve
legal rights involves an examination of the nature of the issues as
well as the remedy sought. In sum, the Court noted that the statu-
tory action must be compared to the eighteenth century action
brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of law and
equity courts. Then, more importantly, the remedy sought must be
examined in order to determine whether it is legal or equitable.
52
The Court stated that an action for breach of a union's duty of
fair representation was unknown in eighteenth century England
because collective bargaining was unlawful; thus, the most analo-
gous cause of action must be found to determine whether the duty
of fair representation is legal or equitable.8 3 The Court was con-
vinced by the union's characterization of a fair representation ac-
tion as being analogous to an action by a trustee for breach of a
fiduciary duty.54 However, even though trust proceedings of this
nature are traditionally equitable, the Supreme Court was not pre-
pared to characterize respondent's claim as wholly equitable.5
Continuing with this line of reasoning, the Supreme Court empha-
sized that the Seventh Amendment question depends on the na-
ture of the particular issue at hand and not simply on the charac-
ter of the overall action. Respondents, in order to recover from
the union, must demonstrate that McLean violated Section 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act by breaching the collective
bargaining agreement and that the union breached its duty of fair
representation. 7
The fair representation issue is "analogous to a claim against a
trustee for breach of a fiduciary duty. '58 However, the Section 301
issue is comparable to a breach of contract claim which is a legal
issue.59 After determining that respondents' cause of action in-
cluded both legal and equitable claims, the Court then had to de-
51. Id at 565, quoting Dimick v Schiedt, 293 US 474, 486 (1935).
52. Local No. 391, 494 US at 565.
53. Id at 565-66.
54. Id at 567.




59. Id at 569-70.
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termine whether respondents were entitled to a jury trial.60 The
Court determined that the remedy sought by respondents was a
legal one. This was because respondents were seeking backpay
which encompasses wages and benefits that would have been re-
ceived if respondents' claims had been properly handled. 1 The
Court noted that it was not faced with the prospect of a monetary
award that was "incidental to or intertwined with injunctive relief"
and therefore would have been equitable.2
The union then contended that backpay under Title VII has
been labeled equitable. This was considered important because the
union further believed that Title VII was modeled after the
backpay provision of the National Labor Relations Act as to unfair
labor practices.63 Therefore, if Title VII remedies have been deter-
mined to be equitable, then naturally the National Labor Relations
Act, upon which Title VII is based, must also provide for equitable
remedies.6 4 The Supreme Court did not accept the union's charac-
terization, emphasizing that the remedy sought in this duty of fair
representation case was different from the backpay provisions
under Title VII. 5
Another recent case adjudicated by the Supreme Court that, by
analogy, may give credence to the right of a jury trial under Title
VII is Granfinanciera, S.A. v Nordberg6 The issue presented for
consideration in Granfinanciera was whether a "person who has
not submitted a claim against a bankruptcy estate has a right to a
jury trial when sued by the trustee in bankruptcy to recover an
allegedly fraudulent money transfer. 6 7 The bankruptcy court orig-
inally denied the petitioner's request for a jury trial, basing its de-
cision on a suit to recover a fraudulent transfer as being a "core
action that originally, under the English common law," was a non-
jury issue.68 The court of appeals affirmed and reiterated that
there was no statutory 9 right to a jury trial. Also, an action to
recover a fraudulent conveyance is equitable in nature, even when
60. Id at 570.
61. Id.
62. Id at 571.
63. Id at 571-72. See also the National Labor Relations Act, 29 USC § 160(c) (1982).
64. Local No. 391, 494 US at 572.
65. Id.
66. 492 US 33 (1989).
67. Granfinanciera, 492 US at 36.
68. Id at 37.
69. 11 USC § 548(a)(2) (1982 ed, Supp V). This is a constructive fraud provision.
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the plaintiff seeks monetary relief. 0 The court of appeals also held
that bankruptcy, by its nature, is also equitable and that Congress
may convert a creditor's legal rights into equitable claims which in
turn would make the Seventh Amendment right to a jury inopera-
tive.71 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if a jury
trial was warranted.72
Similar to the Court in Local No. 391, Justice Brennan in
Granfinanciera first compared the statutory action to eighteenth
century actions brought in English courts prior to the merger of
the courts of equity and law. Then, more importantly, Justice
Brennan noted that the Court must compare the remedy sought
and determine whether it is legal or equitable.7 If the Court then
finds that a jury trial is warranted under the Seventh Amendment,
then the Court must decide if Congress may assign and has as-
signed the decision of the claim at bar to a non-Article III adjudi-
cative body that does not use a jury in the fact-finding process.
7 4
After analyzing English case law from the eighteenth century, the
Court in Granfinanciera determined that this action, to recover an
alleged fraudulent conveyance "of a determinate sum of money,"
must be brought at law, as an English Court of Equity in eight-
eenth century England "would not have adjudicated it.''75 Al-
though a course of action based on fraudulent conveyance is re-
lated to bankruptcy proceedings, a case based on fraudulent
conveyance is separate and entitled to a jury trial under the Sev-
enth Amendment.76
Congress' power to block the Seventh Amendment right to a jury
trial does have limits. Congress may only "deny trials by jury in
actions at law" where "public rights" are litigated. 7 When what
can be termed wholly private cases involving tort, contract, or
property claims among others are involved, then the government
does not have the right to limit the Seventh Amendment right to a
jury trial.78 The Court in Granfinanciera then went on to state
that if a statutory cause of action, such as the cause of action for
70. Granfinanciera, 492 US at 37.
71. Id.
72. Id at 38.
73. Id at 42.
74. Id.
75. Id at 46-47.
76. Id at 50.
77. Id at 51. "Public rights" refers to cases where "the Government is involved in its
sovereign capacity under an otherwise valid statute creating enforceable public rights." Id.
78. Id at 51-52.
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recovery of a fraudulent conveyance under 11 USC § 548(a)(2)
does not involve a "public right" for the purposes of Article III of
the Constitution, then Congress cannot assign the adjudication of
the claim to a specialized non-Article III court lacking "the essen-
tial attributes of the judicial power."7' If the cause of action must
be adjudicated in an Article III court, then the Seventh Amend-
ment protects the right to a jury trial where the cause of action is
grounded in law.80 The Supreme Court then went on to character-
ize a bankruptcy trustee's right to recover a fraudulent conveyance
under 11 USC § 548(e)(2) as a "private right" as opposed to a
"public right."'81 Most importantly, the Court then opined that
permitting jury trials in fraudulent conveyance actions brought by
a trustee would not dismantle the statutory scheme enacted by
Congress. 2 The grant of jury trials may impede the speed at which
bankruptcy proceedings are completed and may even add to the
cost of Chapter 11 reorganizations, but these are not sufficient
grounds to gut the command of the Seventh Amendment.83 A law
may be "efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating the func-
tions of Government," but this alone will not save a law that is
contrary to the Constitution.84
Another recent case from the Supreme Court, Lytle v Household
Mfg Inc.,8 5 also lends itself to the proposition that the Supreme
Court may be prepared to allow trial by jury in Title VII claims.8 6
Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court, stated that "petitioner
brought both equitable and legal claims in the same action, but the
district court erroneously dismissed the legal claims. '87 Justice
Marshall stated that the issue to be decided was "whether the Dis-
trict Court's resolution of the issues raised by petitioner's equita-
ble claims bars relitigation of the same issues before a jury in the
context of his legal claims."8 8
Lytle, an African-American, was discharged from his job because
he accrued more than eight hours of unexcused absences within a
79. Id at 53.
80. Id.
81. Id at 55.
82. Id at 61.
83. Id at 63.
84. Id.
85. 494 US 545, 110 S Ct 1331 (1990).
86. Lytle, 110 S Ct at 1333.




twelve-month period."9 Lytle, after receiving a right to sue letter
from the EEOC, instituted suit seeking both monetary and injunc-
tive relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42
USC § 1981.90 Lytle claimed the discharge was based on race and
because he took his complaint to the EEOC.9 1 Lytle requested a
jury trial "on all issues triable by a jury.
'9 2
At the beginning of the trial, Lytle's Section 1981 civil rights
claim was dismissed by the district court. The court stated that
Title VII provided the sole remedy for Lytle.9 3 After a bench trial
on the Title VII issue in which Lytle presented his case-in-chief,
the court entertained and granted defendant's motion to dismiss.
9 4
The court of appeals affirmed but stated that the district court's
dismissal of the Section 1981 claim was "apparently erroneous" be-
cause "Title VII and section 1981 [are] separate, independent and
distinct. 9e5 However, the appellate court found that the district
court's findings with respect to the Title VII claims collaterally es-
topped Lytle from proceeding with his Section 1981 claim because
the elements of a cause of action under Section 1981 "are identi-
cal" to the elements of a Title VII action.' In sum, the district
court ignored Lytle's claim that ,the Seventh Amendment pre-
vented a collateral estoppel effect of the district court's ruling and
believed that judicial economy of resources is overriding.9 7 The Su-
preme Court reversed.9 8
The Supreme Court in Lytle emphasized that, had it not been
dismissed, Lytle's Section 1981 claim would have been granted a
jury trial.9 When legal and equitable claims are joined in the same
action, "the right to jury trial on the legal claim, including all is-
sues common to both claims, remains intact." 00 Therefore, if the
Section 1981 claim had remained in the suit, Lytle would have
been entitled to a jury trial and the jury would have had to resolve
the Section 1981 claims before the court considered the Title VII
89. Id. The Court noted that there was a dispute as to whether Lytle had informed
his supervisor that he would be absent. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id at 1334-35.








100. Id (citation omitted).
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claims.101 This is so because only rarely can one lose his right to a
jury trial through the prior determination of equitable claims.
102
The purposes of collateral estoppel are not advanced in a case of
this nature where an individual's right to a jury trial is lost merely
because of the erroneous ruling by the trial court.103 Collateral es-
toppel protects parties from multiple lawsuits as well as judicial
resources. 0 4 The Court noted, however, that this case did not pre-
sent the problem of multiple lawsuits; rather, it was a single suit in
which the plaintiff correctly joined his legal and equitable
claims. 0 5 Relitigation of this case was the only way to correct the
error of the district court.1
0 6
The Lytle case demonstrates the Court's tenacity in guarantee-
ing that litigants receive the proper entitlement of a jury when it is
warranted. Justice Marshall is resolute when he states that judicial
economy of resources and problems of collateral estoppel will
rarely influence the court not to guarantee the litigants trial by
jury under the Seventh Amendment when it is clearly war-
ranted. 0 7 Cognizance of the jury's importance is manifested when
Justice Marshall opined that, "had his section 1981 claims not
been dismissed, the jury's determination of legal and factual issues
could not have been disregarded when the District Court consid-
ered [Lytle's] equitable claims." 08 Quite illustrative of the Court's
changing views is its comment that "this court has not ruled on the
question whether a plaintiff seeking relief under Title VII has a
right to a jury trial."'0 9 Such a remark by the Court may intimate
that Title VII, though perceived to be a statute with solely equita-
ble remedies and thus a non-jury statute, may in reality require a
right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.
Another recent case, Vicinanzo v Brunschwig & Fils, Inc.,'" in-
volving the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
and in particular Section 510 of the Act, is relevant to the argu-
ment for Title VII jury entitlement."' Defendant sought to strike
101. Id.
102. Id.




107. Id at 1335.
108. Id at 1338 n 4.
109. Id at 1335 n 1.
110. 739 F Supp 882 (S D NY 1990).
111. Vicinanzo, 739 F Supp at 882.
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plaintiff's demand for a jury trial under Section 510 of ERISA, 112
claiming that there is no statutory right to a jury trial and that, as
an equitable provision, the Seventh Amendment does not apply.
1 3
Plaintiff countered with Section 502 of ERISA,114 claiming that
Section 510 is "enforceable under the private right of action pro-
vided under Section 502," and since "actions brought under Sec-
tion 502 often present legal, as opposed to equitable, claims," there
is a right to trial by jury.11 5 The district court held that plaintiff
was entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment as well
as by statutory implication.11 6 The district court then stated that
"because the right to a jury trial on claims of legal entitlement is
so obvious, ERISA makes no express provision for jury trials even
on fact-oriented issues arising in purely contractual cases.
'11 7
In Paladino v Taxicab Industry Pension Fund,"8 an implied
statutory right to trial by jury was found.1 19 In Paladino, the dis-
trict court stated:
To find that there is no Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial does not
answer the entire question. Even where there is no constitutional right to a
jury trial, a court must examine the statute which created the new right of
action, in this case ERISA, to ascertain whether Congress impliedly pro-
vided a right to a jury trial. The Seventh Amendment does not prevent
Congress from providing a right to a jury trial where a newly contrived stat-
utory remedy is made available to litigants.
120
On balance, in Paladino, the district court found that the intent of
Congress was to regard ERISA plan enforcement actions as legal in
nature. 21
When ascertaining the constitutional right to a jury trial, the fo-
cus must be on the nature of the claims and whether the relief
sought is equitable or legal. 122 However, when the court is asked to
determine the scope of an implied statutory right to a jury trial, "it
is essential to consider interests broader than those protected by
the constitution-including whether 'the crux of the case [is] a fac-
112. 29 USC § 1140 (1974).
113. Vicinanzo, 739 F Supp at 882-83.
114. 29 USC § 1132 (1987).
115. Vicinanzo, 739 F Supp at 883.
116. Id.
117. Id at 885 (emphasis in original).
118. 588 F Supp 37 (S D NY 1984).
119. Vicinanzo, 739 F Supp at 885.
120. Id, quoting Paladino, 588 F Supp at 39.




tual determination' of that sort traditionally made [by] common
law juries." '123
As to a constitutional right to trial by jury under the Seventh
Amendment, the Supreme Court has recognized that the Seventh
Amendment does apply to actions enforcing "statutory rights" and
therefore would require a jury trial on demand as long as legal
rights and remedies are implicated in an action in a court of law.
124
The relevant inquiry when one determines whether there is a right
to a jury trial is whether the claim involves those rights and reme-
dies that "traditionally" were enforced at an action at law. 2 5 The
issue is not whether the rights and remedies have been "recast in
statutory garb" to such an effect that they are no longer character-
ized as legal rights or remedies and may in fact be equitable.
26
The court in Vicinanzo then proceeded to discuss recent litigation
including the Local No. 391 case.127 Local No. 391 essentially is
grounded in the Supreme Court's belief that "great analytical
weight" should be placed on the issues to be proved at trial in or-
der to determine if there is a right to a jury trial.'28 The Vicinanzo
court then switched to the Granfinanciera case, and began a dis-
cussion of the Court's holding and rationale.' 29 Granfinanciera, in
short, stands for the proposition that as long as a legal cause of
action does not involve "public rights," Congress cannot deprive
those parties of the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury. 30
CONCLUSION
How are the courts to react to these recent Supreme Court deci-
sions that arguably create the right of jury trial in Title VII cases
on the grounds that the remedy sought is legal? Courts should be
wary about denying jury trials merely because of "supposed func-
tional or practical considerations."' 3' "Taken together, the Su-
preme Court's recent cases (Lytle, Granfinanciera and Local No.
391) suggest that statutory causes of action giving rise to individ-
ual claims for money damages are rarely, if ever, beyond the reach
123. Id.
124. Id at 887.
125. Id (citation omitted).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id at 888.
129. Id at 888-89.




of the Seventh Amendment. 1 3 2 In sum, Title VII and ERISA are
not wholly equitable statutes nor would the use of jury trials harm
or frustrate the purposes of the statutes.13
Recently, Congress has enacted into law the Civil Rights Act of
1991.14 In particular, Section 794a(b)(2) dictates that "compensa-
tory damages" will not include, among other things, "backpay."
Then, Section 794a(c) declares that if a complaining party seeks
"compensatory" or "punitive" damages, then any party may de-
mand a jury trial.13 5 Arguably, Congress has now spoken as to
whether "backpay" is an equitable remedy. However, as we have
learned from the Supreme Court, recharacterization of a cause of
action or damages will not be tolerated when it flies in the face of
the true characteristics of the action or remedy. In sum, the Court
is more concerned with form over substance. Congress has blinked;
we now have "compensatory" and "punitive" damages with the
right to a jury trial. The issue at hand is whether Congress has
gone far enough to satisfy what some believe to be a Seventh
Amendment constitutional mandate to a jury trial for actions that
are legal in nature. Obviously, Congress has realized that business
entities must be held culpable for their outrageous conduct and
thus punitive damages are appropriate. Congress is correct to bring
business entities into line with others that have long been subject
to punitive damages when their conduct warrants such an award.
One may, however, wonder how the law of Title VII can operate
properly if given to a jury. After all, it is generally accepted that
Congress feared placing just those types of cases into the hands of
a jury that was often prejudiced. The court was the preferred and
designated arbiter as only a judge could rise above underlying com-
munity prejudice and guarantee an impartial trial. One may argue
that the new provisions providing for a jury trial are only worth-
while in some cases while inappropriate in others. The types of
cases where a jury could be used is with an issue that cuts across
race and sex lines. An example of this would be cases involving age
discrimination. A jury can sympathize with these litigants because
everybody ages; however, when only a race issue is present, the use
of a jury trial should be discouraged as often the jury will not iden-
tify with the plaintiff. One only has to read current newspapers in
132. Id at 890.
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order to realize that overt racism and prejudice as to the use of
public facilities (for example, restaurants) is still a devastating
problem. Title VII, as recently amended, will allow the plaintiff the
use of a well-stocked arsenal, with several options, to pursue his or
her case.
We still need to be concerned, however, with fairness. For exam-
ple, an issue that has arisen in Pennsylvania concerning Title VII
actions deals with whether, through the pendent jurisdiction of a
federal district court, a party to a suit based on Title VII and the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act may obtain a trial by jury in
the federal district court under the Seventh Amendment when the
Pennsylvania Act may not provide for a trial by jury in state
courts, even though the relief sought may be characterized as "le-
gal." Whether the answer to this issue is in the affirmative or not
involves issues which are not within the scope of this comment.
However, we should be aware of the fact that some courts are an-
swering "yes" to this question despite the guidance of the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania. Thus, Title VII, through pendent jurisdic-
tion, can create another strategy for those with state claims: For
Sale-Jury Trials on State Issues-No right to a jury trial in your
state needed!!! Perhaps we need to be leery of judicial economy
and the loopholes it may create for some plaintiffs. It all comes
down to the basic principle that those who are similarly situated
should be treated the same, regardless of the forum in which they
choose to have their rights adjudicated.
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